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1. Introduction 
 
Financing healthcare is a global challenge. In the resource-constrained environments 
of developing countries however, this challenge frequently assumes epic proportions, 
a problem that has long been recognised. In 1997, the World Bank estimated average 
per-capita public health spending in low-income countries at $6 in comparison with 
$1,890 in developed countries. Such low levels of spending invariably translate into 
low input levels, insufficient investment in capacity development and low levels of 
health technology; poor remuneration and brain drain of health professionals; and 
ultimately, poor (even harmful) quality of healthcare.  
 
Many initiatives have been implemented in developing countries to try and remedy this 
challenge. In the immediate aftermath of independence from colonial rule, many 
developing countries provided free healthcare for their populations. The negative growth 
patterns that followed the initial boom, coupled with the failure to develop the 
institutional capacity to rope in a large tax base (primarily due to a large informal sector) 
however made it impossible to sustain universal state provision. While continuing to 
receive external assistance therefore, many developing countries have been seeking 
autonomy in healthcare finance by experimenting with user fees, private financing and 
various risk-pooling mechanisms including Community-Based Health Insurance (CBHI) 
and Social Health Insurance (SHI).  It is these last two initiatives that are the objects of 
interest of this study.  
 
CBHIs are frequently cited as a promising transition mechanism to achieving universal 
health coverage through SHI. Discussions concerning CBHI and SHI in developing 
countries are invariably founded in economic or ‘health system’ frameworks, both 
perspectives emphasizing rational individual utility maximisation as the central factor to 
	  	   6	  
consider in a successful implementation of health insurance. It is increasingly apparent 
however that these two frameworks are inadequate to explain the murky evidence on the 
long-term sustainability of CBHIs and their potential to transform into successful SHIs in 
many of today’s developing countries (Bennett, Kelley et al. 2004). In contrast to the 
historical precedent in 19th century European and Japanese societies where CBHIs arose 
spontaneously from grassroots organisations, CBHIs in current developing countries are 
mostly interventions initiated by governments or aid organisations (Meessen, Criel et al. 
2002). Thus, it cannot be assumed as a matter of course that CBHIs in today’s developing 
countries will grow into national health insurance systems just as they did in Europe and 
Japan. The difference in institutional setting may therefore be a pointer for an explicit 
consideration of social context in thinking about CBHIs today, especially if the goal is to 
attain sustainable health financing for Universal Health Coverage (UHC) through that 
medium. 
 
Social Capital theories provide a complimentary framework in this direction. The nature 
and strength of societal relationships are facilitators of any voluntary association, a 
defining feature of CBHIs. In fact, this feature assumes heightened importance in today’s 
developing countries because a large informal sector means that employing a formal 
commitment mechanism to enforce regular contributions is impractical if the aim is UHC. 
Invariably, other mechanisms must be relied upon to drive (continuous) membership and 
guarantee willingness to pay in the informal sector; frequently, these ‘other’ mechanisms 
are social in nature. It is therefore beneficial for any assessment of the potential of a CBHI 
to transition into a National SHI to consider the social norms, values and expressions of 
societal association that manifest in the specific context. 
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The aim of this dissertation is to apply a Social Capital framework to investigate the 
potential for universal informal sector participation in a SHI scheme grounded in 
CBHIs, using Ghana’s National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) as a case study. 
The specific research questions are: 
(1) What do the revealed social norms, values and patterns of association indicate 
with regards to the strength or otherwise of Social Capital in Ghana? 
(2) What are the implications for voluntary informal sector participation in 
Ghana’s NHIS? What do they mean for the Scheme’s design with regards to 
financial sustainability?  
 
We believe such an investigation is important as application of Social Capital theory 
to analysis of CBHIs can offer important insights that can positively affect the design 
and reform of SHI initiatives that are founded in CBHIs in developing countries. 
 
1.1 The Challenge of Healthcare Financing in Ghana 
 
1.1.1 History 
  
(Agyepong and Adjei 2008) provide a historical overview of changes to healthcare 
finance in Ghana. Before independence, the citizenry paid for healthcare out of pocket. In 
the immediate post-independence period, the socialist government of the day introduced 
free healthcare at the point of delivery, financed out of general taxation. The failure of the 
formal economy to take off however meant that that arrangement was unsustainable 
leading to the introduction of user fees in the mid 1970s and substantial hikes in these fees 
in the 1980s. According to (MOH 2001), user fees reduced essential drugs and supplies 
shortages and achieved the financial objective of raising revenue to cover at least 15% of 
recurrent expenditure. (Gilson 1997) thinks otherwise, arguing that Ghana only managed 
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to initially recoup up to 12% of government recurrent expenditure before the figure fell to 
lower levels, rising again only with fee increases. The sustainability of financing 
healthcare out of user fees was therefore doubtful to say the least. More importantly, user 
fees reduced access to both basic and essential healthcare, particularly for the poor, 
leading in many cases to catastrophic consequences (Waddington and Enyimayew 1990, 
Asenso-Okyere, Anum et al. 1998, Agyepong 1999, Nyonator and Kutzin 1999). The 
situation prevailed however until the passage of Act 652 in 2003 with the explicit purpose 
of eliminating the ‘cash and carry’ system (as payments for healthcare services are 
termed in Ghana).  
 
The NHIS is an attempt to provide a social welfare state, at least with respect to 
healthcare. The Scheme’s conceptualisation, design and implementation was highly 
politicised with very little input from technical personnel or academics (Agyepong and 
Adjei 2008). The need for and the ethical uprightness of ensuring access to healthcare 
across the population, irrespective of the ability to pay, dominated the discussions about 
the NHIS and with the benefit of hindsight, it is evident that policymakers may have 
underestimated the difficulty of implementing a viable social welfare system under 
Ghana’s peculiar characteristics.   
 
1.1.2 Ghana’s National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) 
 
In 2003, Ghana’s parliament passed the National Health Insurance Act 650, the primary 
purpose of which was to “secure the provision of basic healthcare services to persons 
resident in the country through mutual and private health insurance schemes”. The Act 
provided the legislative backing for the establishment of a National Health Insurance 
Fund (NHIF) to be managed by a National Health Insurance Authority (NHIA) in pursuit 
of the stated aim through the medium of a National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS). To 
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fully operationalize the NHIS, Act 650 (2003) was followed by the passage of Legislative 
Instrument (LI) 1809 in 2004 which detailed the regulations under which the NHIS was to 
operate, paving the way for the actual implementation of the NHIS in 2005. In 2012, Act 
852 was enacted to replace Act 650 as the main legal instrument. Tables 1 and 2 
summarise the main elements of Ghana’s NHIS and the benefits package respectively. 
Table 1: Main elements of Ghana's NHIS (Culled from Acts 852 (2012) and 650 (2003) and LI 1809 (2004) 
Legislative 
instruments 
 
Act 852 2012 (which replaced Act 650 (2003)) and LI 1809 2004 are the main 
legal frameworks guiding the implementation of health insurance in Ghana 
Governance A Fifteen (15) member National Health Insurance Council manages a National 
Health Insurance Fund, regulate the private health insurance market and accredit 
and (in collaboration with relevant agencies) monitor service providers under the 
scheme.  
Administration 
 
A national Health Insurance Secretariat provides administrative support to the 
National Health Insurance Council in the implementation of the Scheme. 
Private sector schemes may be established but do not receive subsidies from 
government. These operate as insurance schemes based on a premium, contract and 
policy. 
A Health Complaints Committee of the NHIC with decentralised offices in every 
district office of the Council.  
Membership 
 
Enrolment and membership in the National Health Insurance Scheme is mandatory 
for all residents of Ghana. Persons eligible to membership are expected to pay a 
contribution of Gh¢ 7.2 per year (equivalent of US$ 7.74 at time of passage of Act 
650).. 
The scheme provides for persons to be exempted from paying membership fees. 
These are: 
• Contributors to the SSNIT or those drawing pension benefits on SSNIT  
• Persons in need of ante-natal, delivery and post-natal health care services  
• Persons under the age of 18  
• Persons above the age 70 years  
• Persons classified as indigents by the Minister for Social Welfare 
• Other categories prescribed by the Minister 
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Table 2: NHIS Benefits Package (Culled from LI 1809 (2004)) 
Service  
Provision 
 
The legislative instrument defines a benefit and an exclusion package for which a 
member of the scheme may have access 
Any service provider wishing to provide services to members of the scheme may 
apply to the NHIC for accreditation to provide a specified set of services from the 
benefit package according to their assessed competency.  
 
Outpatient 
Services 
 
General and specialist consultation reviews 
General and specialist diagnostic testing, including laboratory investigation, X-rays, ultra 
sound scanning 
Medicines on the NHIS list 
Surgical operations such as hernia repairs, incision and drainage, haemorrhoidectomy 
Physiotherapy 
Inpatient 
Services 
 
General and specialist in-patient care 
Diagnostic tests 
Medication prescribed on the NHIS medicines list, blood and blood products 
Surgical operations 
In-patient physiotherapy 
Accommodation in general ward 
Feeding provided by health facility 
Oral health  Pain relief (tooth extraction, temporary incision and drainage) 
Dental restoration (simple amalgam filling, temporary dressing) 
Maternity  
care  
Antenatal care 
Deliveries (Normal and assisted) 
Caesarean section 
Postnatal care 
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The replacement of Act 650 (2003) by Act 852 (2012) fundamentally changed the 
structure and operation of the NHIS – the district mutual funds, hitherto the basic unit 
of the NHIS, were collapsed into the centralised NHIA. The operation of Ghana’s 
NHIS has been fraught challenges on many fronts, the most significant of which is 
the dangerous revenue-expenditure mismatch that has left the scheme on the brink of 
insolvency (Schieber, Cashin et al. 2012) . 
 
Although it is an attempt to provide social health insurance, Ghana’s NHIS has 
peculiar characteristics that distinguish it from traditional models of social health 
insurance practised in other countries. In particular, the combination of a large 
informal sector, weak state capacity and a small tax base means that an economy-
wide compulsory commitment mechanism is impractical to implement. Although Act 
852 (2012) (and 650 (2003) before it) stipulated mandatory membership, in de facto, 
Eye Care  
services  
Refraction 
Visual Fields 
A- Scan 
Keratometry 
Cataract Removal 
Eye Lid Surgery 
Emergencies Medical emergencies 
Surgical emergencies 
Paediatric emergencies 
Obstetric and gynecological emergencies 
Road traffic accidents 
Industrial and Workplace accidents 
Dialysis for acute renal failure 
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enrolment in the NHIS is voluntary, making it an ideal test case to investigate the 
potential for CBHI to attain UHC. Increasingly, Social Capital is seen as the critical 
success factor for voluntary CBHI schemes in the developing world. Social Capital 
has implications for willingness to pay, moral hazard, adverse selection and the 
management of schemes, among other things. Although promoted by the Ghanaian 
government, the NHIS has its genesis in CBHIs, the District-Mutual Health Insurance 
Schemes (DMHIS) that initially formed the basic units of Ghana’s NHIS. The 
defining characteristic of CBHIs, their voluntary nature, has been retained by the 
NHIS’ design. Even formal sector workers, who compulsorily contribute to the 
Scheme’s financing through payroll taxes, are required to physically enrol in the 
scheme by paying a registration fee at a scheme office before they can access benefits 
under the scheme. Informal sector workers, who form the majority of Ghanaians, are 
required to pay a (graduated) premium (in addition to the registration fee) to enrol on 
the scheme.  
1.1.3 Financial Sustainability of the NHIS 
 
The NHIS’ revenues are currently insufficient to meet its expenditures (Fig. 1). 
Although much discussed, options to increase revenues from the current financing 
arrangements are seriously constrained in practice by many considerations (Schieber, 
Cashin et al. 2012  p. 154-163). In terms of relative contribution however, the most 
serious revenue shortfall occurs in contributions from the informal sector, which 
currently accounts for less than 5% of the NHIS revenues (Fig 2), in spite of the 
sector employing over 75% of Ghanaians. Clearly the revenues of the NHIS are 
insufficient to meet current obligations, let alone future ones, and the Scheme is 
dangerously tottering on the verge of insolvency. A seemingly viable option therefore 
is to increase enrolment from the informal sector as this would increase revenues 
while broadening the risk pool. But is this truly feasible? 
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Figure 1: NHIS Financial Indicators (Source: NHIA Annual Reports, 2008-2011) 
 
Figure 2: Actual NHIF Revenue by source (Source: NHIA Annual Reports, 2008-2011) 
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1.1.4 The Social Welfare State  
 
If Ghana’s attempts can be interpreted as an attempt to institute a social welfare state 
(at least in the health sector), then it is beneficial to examine the conditions under 
which such an undertaking is feasible. The Social Welfare state “has the ultimate aim 
of securing a minimum welfare to its citizens, protecting them against the risks of 
unemployment, sickness, maternity and old age, and providing an adequate 
accumulation of human capital through public investments in education and health” 
(Segura-Ubiergo 2007). Among the prerequisites that enable a viable social welfare 
state, the most prominent are high productivity levels from the employed population 
and “a large and relatively well-off population that can absorb high rates of taxation” 
(Karger 1996). Of course this implicitly assumes a strong state capacity to raise 
revenue through direct and indirect taxation. Also quite important for the current 
discussion, (Karger 1996) makes the observation that the majority of job creation in 
the globalised economy occurs in low-paying service or secondary (informal) sectors, 
a fact that makes it all the more difficult for under-developed African countries to 
achieve the preconditions stated earlier while at the same time increasing their need 
for social welfare institutions. 
 
1.1.5 Informality and the pursuit of Social Welfare in Ghana 
 
The very term informal sector was coined in Ghana in the seminal 1971 study by the 
British anthropologist Kevin Hart which focused on the economic activities of the 
migrant Frafra in urban Accra (Hart 1973). Since then, Ghana has not done much to 
lose the unenviable tag of having a ‘large informal economy’. If anything, the 
informal sector has rather increased in size. (BOG 2007) and (Aryeetey and Baah-
Boateng 2007) both estimated the sector to account for 80% of employment in 
Ghana.  Tables 4 and 5, taken from the 2010 Population and Housing Census, present 
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the most comprehensive estimates of the extent of informal sector employment in 
Ghana. As shown in table 5, a staggering 86% of employment in Ghana is in the 
private informal sector.  
 
While employment opportunities in the sector are not necessarily inferior – it is well 
established that many people in developing countries voluntarily choose to work 
there (Maloney 2004, Günther and Launov 2012)  – it is the case in Ghana that the 
sector is characterised by low productivity, low remuneration and non-existent job 
security (MOFEP 2012). These characteristics of the Ghanaian economy pose 
effective constraints to the government’s revenue raising efforts an example of which 
is the recent revelation by the government’s Tax Policy Advisor that only two million 
out of six million eligible tax payers in Ghana pay taxes (Siaw 2014). The Bank of 
Ghana also estimated Ghana’s tax revenues as a percentage of GDP to be 16.7% in 
2011 (BOG 2012), a far cry from the upwards of 30% realised in most OECD 
countries (with the important exception of the United States).  
 
Table 3: Persons aged 15+ by locality and activity status (Source: (GSS 2013) 
All Localities 
Persons 
15 years 
and older 
Employed Unemployed Not economically active All status 
 Both 
Sexes 10,243,476 575,807 4,389,142 15,208,425 
Males 5,005,534 254,955 1,965,412 7,225,901 
Females 5,237,942 320,852 2,423,730 7,982,524 
  URBAN 
Persons 
15 years 
and older 
Employed Unemployed Not Economically active All status 
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Both 
Sexes 5,125,635 410,267 2,687,047 8,222,949 
Males 2,477,284 182,894 1,202,927 3,863,105 
Females 2,648,351 227,373 1,484,120 4,359,844 
  RURAL 
Persons 
15 years 
and older 
Employed Unemployed Not economically active All status 
Both 
Sexes 5,117,841 165,540 1,702,095 6,985,476 
Males 2,528,250 72,061 762,485 3,362,796 
Females 2,589,591 93,479 939,610 3,622,680 
  Unemployment rate 
  All localities Urban Rural   
 Both 
sexes 5.30% 7.40% 3.10%   
Men 4.80% 6.90% 2.80%   
Women 5.80% 7.90% 3.50%   
          
          
 
 
Table 4: Employed persons by locality and sector of employment (Source: (GSS 
2013) 
  
All localities 
(Total 
sectorial 
employment) 
Urban Rural 
Sectorial 
Share of total 
employment 
All 
occupations All Sectors   
Both Sexes 10,243,476 5,125,63 5,117,841 100.0% 
Male 5,005,534 2,477,284 2,528,250   
Female 5,237,942 2,648,351 2,589,591   
All 
occupations Public   
Both Sexes 638,862 481,662 157,200 6.2% 
Male 405,320 299,274 106,046   
Female 233,542 182,388 51,154   
All 
occupations Private Formal   
Both Sexes 699,746 572,021 127,725 6.8% 
Male 486,216 395,336 90,880   
Female 213,530 176,685 36,845   
	  	   17	  
All 
occupations Private Informal   
Both Sexes 8,834,639 4,021,852 4,812,787 86.2% 
Male 4,066,499 1,747,240 2,319,259   
Female 4,768,140 2,274,612 2,493,528   
All 
occupations Semi-public/Parastatal   
Both Sexes 13,581 10,357 3,224 0.1% 
Male 9,649 7,452 2,197   
Female 3,932 2,905 1,027   
All 
occupations NGOs and International Organisations   
Both Sexes 56,648 39,743 16,905 0.6% 
Male 37,850 27,982 9,868   
Female 18,798 11,761 7,037   
          
 
 
With this background in context therefore, Ghana’s policymakers were innovative in 
their introduction of social health insurance into a difficult environment. They did not 
restrict the NHIS to the formal sector because doing so would have effectively 
impeded progress towards Universal Health Coverage. The design of the funding 
mechanism to incorporate an indirect tax, a payroll tax for the small formal sector and 
premiums from the informal sector reflect an attempt to circumvent the constraints 
identified above while accounting for the fact that ultimately, someone had to pay for 
the cost of healthcare. The need for social health insurance was indisputable if access 
to healthcare was to be divorced from ability to pay. To emphasize the point, the 
design of the NHIS, with particular reference to the financing arrangement, may be 
interpreted as an acknowledgement by policymakers that the conventional approach 
to social health insurance employed in advanced nations would be impractical in 
Ghana for various reasons. These reasons include fiscal constraints, the structure of 
the economy and the inter-sectorial division of employment between the formal and 
informal sectors.  
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Ultimately however, the innovative design notwithstanding, the current challenges 
being faced by the NHIS have made it apparent that the explicit attempt to 
incorporate the informal sector and the de facto voluntary nature of enrolment brings 
up new considerations of what factors assume the role of critical enablers in order to 
facilitate the ‘new’ model’s success at raising sufficient revenues to cover 
expenditures. As already noted in the Introduction, the economic and health systems 
frameworks that are the staples of health insurance discussions are unable to explain 
the confounding factors noted in in the performance of many CBHIs across the 
developing world and therefore their potential to transition into viable SHIs. 
Increasingly, the literature is converging on Social Capital as the critical enabling 
factor that has been ignored in the analysis, the inclusion of which is beneficial if a 
complete understanding of the workings of CBHIs in today’s developing world is to 
be attained.  
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2. Conceptual Framework 
 
2.1 CBHI and Universal Health Coverage 
 
Universal coverage is achieved in a health system when all residents of a country are 
able to have access to adequate healthcare at affordable prices (Carrin, James et al. 
2004). The current international policy model linking CBHI and universal coverage is 
implicitly informed by the history of health service financing in Europe and Japan, 
where CBHI schemes in the 19th century eventually merged into various forms of 
national health financing structures (Criel and Van Dormael 1999). However, many 
studies highlight that although lessons can be learned, assuming that CBHIs in 
today’s developing world will follow the historical precedent and transform into 
sustainable forms of national health financing is fatally simplistic given the different 
socio-economic contexts and circumstances (Criel and Van Dormael 1999, 
Bärnighausen and Sauerborn 2002, Ogawa, Hasegawa et al. 2003, Carrin and James 
2005). 
For instance, although there were approximately 27,000 ‘friendly societies’ that 
functioned like CBHIs in the United Kingdom alone in the 19th century, the total 
number of CBHIs in the whole of West Africa in 2003 was estimated at 585 (Bennett, 
Kelley et al. 2004). In fact, (Asenso-Okyere, Osei-Akoto et al. 1997) document only 
one community-wide health insurance scheme in Ghana – the Nkoranza Community 
Health Insurance Scheme – just six years before the CBHI-based NHIS was initiated. 
Another dissimilarity is that today’s CBHI schemes are mostly top-down 
interventions led by development agencies or national governments, in contrast to 
those of 19th century Europe and Japan that were locally initiated by working class 
movements and employers (Criel and Van Dormael 1999, Meessen, Criel et al. 2002). 
In sum, the conditions prevailing in today’s developing world differ considerably 
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from those in Europe and Japan 150 years ago. Recognition of this difference 
crucially underscores the need to go beyond the current construct of policy-
conception if constraints to increasing CBHI coverage and sustainability are to be 
successfully addressed. In this pursuit, the social capital framework can be viewed as 
a practical attempt to remedy this need for an alternative, or complement, to income-
based and purely economic approaches to development (Bebbington 2004).  
Several studies show that low-income households are willing to pay for CBHI (Dong, 
Kouyate et al. 2003, Asgary, Willis et al. 2004, Dror, Radermacher et al. 2007, 
Gustafsson-Wright, Asfaw et al. 2009). We highlight (Asenso-Okyere, Osei-Akoto et 
al. 1997 pp. 225) which had as its expressed goal the assessment of “the willingness 
of the informal sector to join and pay premiums for health insurance under a National 
Health Insurance scheme in Ghana.” Employing contingent valuation, the authors 
found that up to 63.3% of a sample of households in the informal sector were willing 
to pay premiums of about $3.03 a month.  
However, “in empirical analyses, ignoring the role of social capital in WTP may 
result in omitted variable bias, as the decision to pay…may be correlated with 
variables which are not included in the model. As a matter of fact, social capital in a 
community is vital for the sustainability and effective functioning of CBHI” 
(Donfouet and Mahieu 2012 pp. 2).  
Social capital is a major determinant of the WTP for CBHI; the greater the social 
capital in the community, the more people are willing to prepay for CBHI (Hsiao 
2001). Solidarity and trust between members form a key foundation for the successful 
functioning of a CBHI (BIT 2002). A high level of social capital is also associated 
with a high level of altruism among individuals making it possible to consider the 
welfare of other members of the group (Durlauf and Fafchamps 2004). As a matter of 
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fact, (De Allegri, Sanon et al. 2006) found that relevant social and political incentives 
may be diametrically opposed to incentives designed using technical and scientific 
expertise (such as economic theory) in a qualitative study of a CBHI in Burkina Faso.  
(Donfouet, Essombè et al. 2011) utilize an interval regression model to confirm a 
positive and significant impact of social capital on the demand for CBHI across six 
villages in the Western Region of Cameroon. Using logistic regression, (Zhang, 
Wang et al. 2006) demonstrate that social capital measured by trust and reciprocity 
has a positive and significant effect on the demand for CBHI subsidized by the 
Chinese government – people are more willing to accept the implicit cross-
subsidization. (Desmet, Chowdhury et al. 1999, Criel and Waelkens 2003, Schneider 
2005) have also confirmed the importance of this solidarity in Bangladesh, Guinea 
and Rwanda respectively.  
On the other hand, strong intra-group ties may have negative consequences for 
sustainable CBHI schemes by promoting adverse selection or crowding out the 
formal insurance scheme as was found by (Atim 1999) in Ghana and (Jowett 2003) in 
Vietnam respectively. Probably therefore, the presence of more than one type of 
social capital may be required for it to have a positive effect on CBHIs. One 
Guatemalan scheme, which failed on first launch, was later revived with the support 
of the Catholic Church, an important social institution in the country (Ron 1999). 
Community involvement in the scheme’s decision-making and the relationship 
between scheme members on one hand and the governing authority on the other have 
also been demonstrated to affect the sustainability of CBHIs in Senegal (Franco, 
Mbengue et al. 2004). 
Already therefore, these provide pointers that may contribute towards understanding 
the low level of NHIS membership 10 years into its implementation, which is 
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markedly at variance with the prognosis that (Asenso-Okyere, Osei-Akoto et al. 
1997)’s study suggested. Incorporating the social factor, including the sense of 
kinship and shared concern for each other in the community, through an engagement 
with Social Capital theories therefore has the potential to contribute valuable 
conceptualization, design, implementation and reform lessons for CBHI-founded SHI 
initiatives in developing countries. 
 
2.2  Social Capital 
 
There is a consistency at the general level in the literature on what Social Capital 
entails although it defies a standard definition. Among the earliest definitions are 
those by (Bourdieu 1980) and (Coleman 1988), two authors who are among the first 
to have published systematic expositions of Social Capital. They respectively defined 
Social Capital as “the sum of resources, actual and virtual, that accrue to an 
individual or a group by virtue of possessing a durable network or less 
institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition’ (Bourdieu 
1980) and “…a variety of different entities having two characteristics in common: 
they all consist of some aspect of social structure and they facilitate certain actions of 
individuals who are within the structure’ (Coleman 1988). More recent definitions 
include 
“social networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from 
them…” (Putnam 2001 p. 19) 
“trust, concern for one’s associates, a willingness to live by the norms of one’s 
community and to punish those who do not”(Bowles and Gintis 2002 p. F419) and 
a person’s or group’s sympathy toward another person or group that may produce a 
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potential benefit, advantage, and preferential treatment for another person or group of 
persons beyond that expected in an exchange relationship”. (Robison, Schmid et al. 
2002 p. 19)  
As noted by (Allinger 2013), the multiplicity of definitions is due to different authors 
referencing either its “nature” or its “effects” in their conceptualization.  
Among the common concepts that come to mind with the mention of Social Capital 
are therefore trust, solidarity, reciprocity, togetherness, social networks and such-like 
terms. Social Capital does not merely inhere in the existence of social relationships 
but in the extent to which these relationships can be leveraged for some (invariably 
common) good. In this sense, it may be compared to other forms of Capital (viewed 
as an investment good or a factor of production), although there is much debate on 
the extent of comparability (Arrow 2000). In discussions of the concept therefore, it 
is essential to highlight that not all social relations are ‘Social Capital’ and that indeed 
some types of Social Capital may have undesirable consequences that preclude 
manifestations of supposed benefits. It is also important to point out that the different 
types of Social Capital inhering in society have different roles to play and as is being 
increasingly recognised in the literature, the extent to which Social Capital is 
productive depends on the particular combination of Social Capital types that exist in 
the community. This understanding is particularly crucial for examining the potential 
of collective endeavours that transcend the immediate group level. The dichotomy is 
usually drawn with reference to “strong ties” and “weak ties”. (Woolcock and 
Narayan 2000) explain strong ties as the close relationships that exist between 
individuals and their families, friends, ethnic groups etc, that is the personal 
interactions that pertain in a particular closed group. This is intra-community Social 
Capital. “Weak ties” on the other hand consist in interactions over different open 
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groups or networks (interactions with other ethnic groups, civil society organisations, 
local/national government etc) and corresponds to extra-community Social Capital. In 
summary therefore, (Woolcock and Narayan 2000) consider bonding (strong) and 
bridging (weak) Social Capital at both the micro intra-community and macro extra-
community levels, noting that the presence to different degrees of these types will 
determine the success potential for collective action at different social group levels.  
In a pioneering attempt to explicitly incorporate the application of Social Capital to 
analysis of CBHI in developing countries, (Mladovsky and Mossialos 2008) have 
adapted Woolcock’s framework (Woolcock 1998, Woolcock 2001, Woolcock and 
Narayan 2006), and it is their synthesis that is employed in this dissertation to 
examine Ghana’s NHIS in a quest to understand informal sector participation. This is 
crucial in evaluating the feasibility of the oft-suggested policy recommendation to 
raise the level of informal sector enrolment in the pursuit of scheme sustainability. 
For the purposes of this dissertation therefore, we adopt the following definition of 
Social Capital provided by Woolcock: “the information, trust and norms of 
reciprocity inhering in one’s social network’’ (Woolcock 1998 p. 153).   
 
2.3  Theoretical Framework  
 
(Mladovsky and Mossialos 2008) summarise the rich Social Capital literature into an 
evaluative framework for the analysis of Community-Based Health Insurance 
Schemes, taking into account contextual considerations. Their key proposition is that 
incorporation of “the social determinants of CBHI could result in structures that differ 
from those proposed by current analytic frameworks”. Are the current contraptions of 
CBHI being implemented in developing countries missing out on critical success 
factors by ignoring ‘social determinants’? Is the assumption by Ghana’s NHIA that 
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the informal sector will simply (rationally) voluntarily subscribe to the NHIS because 
of the risk-mitigation it offers flawed? What do the revealed social norms, values and 
patterns of association in Ghanaian society indicate with regards to the strength or 
otherwise of Social Capital? What are the implications for voluntary informal sector 
participation in the NHIS and the Scheme’s financial viability? Would considering 
such ‘social determinants’ provide pointers on the appropriate design and 
implementation of such a CBHI-founded SHI? These are the questions that this 
dissertation seeks to find answers to by employing (Mladovsky and Mossialos 
2008)’s framework. In their adaptation of Woolcock’s work for the analysis of CBHI, 
they categorise Social Capital into four types that elucidate the key Social Capital 
concepts of trust, solidarity and togetherness as well as social linkages in both intra 
and extra community networks and state-society relations. This makes their 
framework an ideal tool to explore the implications of Social Capital for CBHI and 
SHI. These important contextual factors particularly influence voluntary enrolment, 
willingness to pay and the feasibility of different financing options, key determinants 
of long-term Scheme viability and sustainability. A fuller exposition of the four 
categories follows in the sub-sections below.  
2.3.1 Bonding Social Capital inhering in micro-level intra-community ties  
 
The basic category of Social Capital is present in “dense networks within 
communities” and is thought of as being particularly productive because it inheres in 
the basic behavioural norms and expectations, channels of information, 
trustworthiness of structures and sanctions that are the foundations of beneficial 
interactions (Coleman 1988). This type of Social Capital is therefore essentially 
conceived as the cornerstone of community development, a critical enabler of 
personal and communal socio-economic advancement. (Woolcock 2001)’s 
framework however recognises that in certain settings, the same intra-community 
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bonding ties may become unproductive, as for instance when abuse of trust results in 
free-riding or when sanctions impede the flow of information. This may hamper 
effective communal action.  
 
Applied in the context of voluntary CBHIs, (Mladovsky and Mossialos 2008) note 
that bonding Social Capital inhering in micro-level intra-community ties have both 
positive and negative effects which have implications for adverse selection, moral 
hazard, and (most importantly from the perspective of this study), on the willingness 
to pay (enrolment). Thus trust may reduce adverse selection and moral hazard, while 
solidarity or feelings of togetherness may increase the willingness to pay. Therein lies 
the perceived power of Social Capital - to persuade agents into participating in 
insurance through mechanisms that are distinctly different from the usual ‘what is in 
it for me’ (rational agent utility maximisation theorem) that dominates standard 
models of insurance. In the absence of a formal compulsion mechanism therefore, it 
is easy to see the critical facilitating role that bonding Social Capital in micro-level 
intra-community network may play in any social health insurance endeavour. This 
positive role of bonding micro-level Social Capital is further strengthened by trust in 
the respective providers of health and insurance services at the local level. This Social 
Capital may be generated by behavioural norms such as increased politeness and 
improved quality of care by medical staff, transparency, accountability and 
community involvement in scheme management and recourse to justice in case of 
fraud (Atim 1999, Meessen, Criel et al. 2002, Criel and Waelkens 2003, Schneider 
2004, Schneider 2005). Taken together therefore, bonding Social Capital inhering at 
the micro-level can “facilitate willingness to pay” because solidarity promotes 
acceptance of the “implicit cross-subsidisation” that is the hallmark of social 
insurance (Mladovsky and Mossialos 2008).  
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The effects of Social Capital inhering at the micro level are not unambiguously 
positive however, and the negative effects can powerfully contrast the positive so that 
the overall effect in a particular setting is empirical. In the case of a social health 
insurance, individuals with strong intra-community norms of trust and reciprocity 
may see no need to enrol in and contribute to a national pool as they perceive as 
adequate the informal health risk management mechanism that already exists  – in 
this case, “Social Capital ‘crowds out’ voluntary health insurance” (Meessen, Criel et 
al. 2002, Jowett 2003). The unwillingness to enrol in a social health insurance scheme 
can also result in a setting where there is strong fragmentation along ethnic lines with 
little inter-ethnic trust and/or rapport. The strong intra-ethnic bonds are then negative 
for a social health insurance scheme that is sustainable only through participation by 
a large number of people, over and above individual ethnic group sizes.  
 
Considered in the context of willingness to pay for a voluntary national health 
insurance scheme therefore, bonding Social Capital inhering at the micro-level has 
positive effects only if it inheres both within and across heterogeneous groups in the 
community. Since this type of Social Capital is not easily constructible, it is not 
simply the case that imposing a formal structure that bypasses ethnic and other sub-
group organisations will ensure that it is positive. Therefore, it is this type of Social 
Capital that is the principal object of interest for this investigation as it is the kind that 
primarily affects willingness to voluntarily enrol/pay.  The success of a social health 
insurance scheme is dependent on more than just the willingness to pay however. We 
briefly mention the other types of Social Capital in (Mladovsky and Mossialos 
2008)‘s framework and consider their implications for voluntary health insurance. 
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The main goal is to highlight the potential (if somewhat indirect) impact they may 
have on the willingness to pay. 
2.3.2 Bridging Social Capital inhering in micro-level extra-community 
networks 
 
(Mladovsky and Mossialos 2008) sub-categorise this type of Social Capital into 
horizontal civil society links and vertical bridging links. The horizontal civil society 
links have an effect on the overall success of the SHI by enlarging the number of 
insured persons, diversifying the risk profile of the scheme, improving solvency and 
enabling professional involvement in scheme management, audit and supervision as 
well as formal linkages with other health system actors (Maeda and Schieber 1997, 
Meessen, Criel et al. 2002). The positive effects of these horizontal links are 
perceived to be even more effective when the linkages are across heterogeneous 
groups.  (Mladovsky and Mossialos 2008) also argue that vertical linkages allow 
CBHIs to build capacity in technical areas. They particularly mention non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) and faith-based organisations (FBOs) as having 
crucial roles to play in this way.  
 
In a national social health insurance scheme, vertical and horizontal links are inherent 
in the design as local schemes are linked into a national supervisory body for support, 
supervision, subsidies and promotion of interactions with other health system 
institutions. In particular, Ghana’s government mandated insurance scheme instituted 
a formal structure in which the NHIA plays a central coordinating role. With this in 
mind, horizontal civil society and vertical bridging links such as support from NGOs 
and FBOs inures to the benefit of the scheme in many ways. Of particular interest to 
this dissertation is the fact that they may foster enrolment and willingness to pay by 
continually promoting solidarity among heterogeneous groups. This is especially true 
	  	   29	  
of faith-based organisations as religion holds a very special place in Ghanaian society 
(Addai, Opoku-Agyeman et al. 2013). 
2.3.3 Bridging Social Capital inhering in relations between communities 
and macro-level state institutions  
 
According to (Mladovsky and Mossialos 2008), engagement by state officials (local 
and central) in promoting and sustaining citizen involvement generates positive 
Social Capital for the achievement of social policies, even as the same may inhere if 
effective links exist between various groups and public institutions.  
With respect to CBHIs, the authors note that government can promote state-society 
‘synergy’ through ‘complementarity’ and ‘embeddedness’ (Evans 1996). 
Complementarity is basically the provision of an enabling environment for the 
effective operation of the health insurance scheme. This may be pursued through 
effective monitoring and regulation of health providers and “improving quality, 
efficiency and sustainability through strategic purchasing”. Embeddedness constructs 
Social Capital through continuous informal interactions between various groups/ 
private organisations and public institutions at the local level. This is argued to 
facilitate ‘listening’ and to allow locally tailored responses to emergent issues within 
defined limits. In a weak institutional setting however (particularly societies with 
large inequalities), embeddedness may result in clientelism and corruption. 
(Mladovsky and Mossialos 2008) highlight state-society synergy as being particularly 
important in countries such as Ghana where government scales up CBHIs into a 
national social health insurance scheme. To promote equitable access in such as 
scheme, indigents will need to be subsidized while the large informal sector is 
targeted to make contributions. The potential to successfully target the informal 
sector for enrolment is the object of this study. The literature points to the conclusion 
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that the primary determinant of the willingness to voluntarily enrol (pay) for a 
national health insurance scheme is the Social Capital inhering in micro-level intra-
community ties, and this should be considered first if any targeting of the informal 
sector is to have a chance of veritable success. 
2.3.4 Bonding Social Capital inhering in macro-level social relations within 
public institutions. 
 
This type of Social Capital effectively refers to commitment within public institutions 
to work to advance collective goals in a professional manner, such commitment 
embedded in relations between the individuals who constitute these institutions. Such 
Social Capital (“organisational integrity”), if sufficiently shared across a wide 
spectrum of the society, will serve as a natural constraint on corruption, nepotism and 
clientelism (Woolcock 1998).  
Obviously this has an effect on the success of a national health insurance scheme 
such as Ghana’s NHIS. The NHIA is the primary public institution responsible for 
the implementation of Ghana’s NHIS and its integrity is inextricably linked to the 
overall success of the scheme. How well it performs its functions will, among other 
things, affect the willingness of people in the informal sector to (continuously) 
participate in the scheme, as will the integrities of the supervisory Ministry of Health 
(MoH) and the public Ghana Health Service (GHS). 
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3. Methodology and Data 
 
A formal approach is essential in any attempt to investigate the relationship between 
informality, Social Capital and the potential to increase the NHIS’ revenues through 
voluntary enrolment. An evaluative framework permits assessment of policy effectiveness 
and minimises resource waste (Downie, Tannahill et al. 1996) aiding policymakers in 
their decisions regarding the continuance or otherwise of a policy (Costongs and Springett 
1997). There are additional demands on the policy process due to the complex nature of 
health public policy necessitates a greater use of qualitative methods supplemented by 
quantitative data as needed (Oneill and Pederson 1992). Quite as important, they also 
assert that this allows “for more attention to values, for wider participation in policy-
making, for an explicit assessment of policy impact on health and for a greater 
understanding of the policy process.” 
 
Considering the above, (Mladovsky and Mossialos 2008)’s theoretical framework is 
well-suited for the analysis of the relationship between assessed Social Capital and 
the willingness to voluntary enrol in Ghana’s NHIS. Their adaptation is also explicit 
in its attempt to incorporate matters of consideration for countries that scale up 
CBHIs into National Social Health Insurance Schemes, a distinctive fact that reflects 
Ghana’s experience with the NHIS. (Mladovsky and Mossialos 2008) represents a 
pioneering attempt to incorporate behavioural thinking into analysis of CBHIs, 
reflecting the need to move beyond traditional economic and health system 
frameworks in order to understand the not-so-obvious factors that frequently 
confound expected outcomes. The four categories they present have clear linkages to 
areas of impact in the milieu of factors that make for a successful SHI as has been 
extensively discussed above and this makes it a superior framework for health policy 
evaluation. 
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3.1  Research Design 
 
Following a survey of empirically tested measurement frameworks, we adopt 
Narayan and Cassidy (2001)’s construct to evaluate the existence and strength of 
Social Capital in Ghanaian society in the data analysis. Their assessment framework 
encapsulates Social Capital measures (group characteristics; generalized norms; 
togetherness; everyday sociability; neighbourhood connections; volunteerism; and 
trust), determinant measures (identity; communication) and outcome measures 
(quality of government; honesty/corruption; peace, crime and safety; political 
engagement). To the extent of data availability, this typology forms the sub-sections 
of the data analysis, which mainly employs a descriptive presentation of the data in 
quantifying the manifest Social Capital in Ghanaian society.  
The second part of the work analytically presents the implications of the existent 
Social Capital for voluntary informal sector participation. The theoretical framework 
is employed to draw the relationship between the level of Social Capital that 
manifests within and across groups in Ghanaian society and the experienced level of 
voluntary informal sector participation in the NHIS. The four types of Social Capital 
in the framework therefore form the sub-sections in the discussion section.  
A conclusion summarizes the evidence on Social Capital presented from the data 
analysis and the implications drawn from the application of (Mladovsky and 
Mossialos 2008)’s framework to that Social Capital. 
3.2  Data 
 
Our main data source for the evaluation of Social Capital is the Afrobarometer, a 
comparative survey of subjective public attitudes in participating African countries, 
which has been conducted in 5 rounds from 1999 to 2012. It is a joint enterprise of 
the Institute for Democracy in South Africa (IDASA), the Center for Democratic 
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Development (CDD-Ghana), the Institute for Empirical Research in Political 
Economy (IREEP), and the Institute for Development Studies (IDS) at the University 
of Nairobi in Kenya, with additional technical support provided by Michigan State 
University (MSU) and University of Cape Town (UCT). The Afrobarometer National 
Partner in Ghana is the Ghana Center for Democratic Development (CDD-Ghana). 
To the best of our knowledge, the Afrobarometer is the only survey that 
comprehensively and systematically includes measures of Social Capital in its 
research of public attitudes in African countries. The survey also makes it clear that it 
is a gauge of subjective public attitudes, a fact that is in direct agreement with a 
concept as subjective as Social Capital. 
The sample is designed as a representative cross-section of all non-institutionalized 
citizens of voting age in a given country (on occasion, the researchers also exclude 
people living in areas deemed inaccessible due to conflict or insecurity). The goal is 
to give every adult citizen an equal and known chance of selection for interview. The 
researchers strive to reach this objective by (a) strictly applying random selection 
methods at every stage of sampling and by (b) applying sampling with probability 
proportionate to population size wherever possible. Samples usually include either 
1200 or 2400 cases. A randomly selected sample of 1,200 cases allows inferences to 
national adult populations with a margin of sampling error of no more than plus or 
minus 2.5 percent with a confidence level of 95 percent. If the sample size is 
increased to 2,400, the confidence interval shrinks to plus or minus 2 percent. The 
sample design is therefore a clustered, stratified, multi-stage, area probability sample, 
and based on this methodology, Afrobarometer data sets can be treated as being 
approximately self-weighting (Afrobarometer 2013). Ghana has participated in all 5 
rounds. In this study, we select Rounds 1, 3 and 5 (1999, 2005 and 2012), signifying 
before NHIS implementation, fledgling stage of NHIS implementation and mature 
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NHIS implementation respectively. The significant time stretch covered by the 
selected years allows us to capture any changes in attitudes and perceptions over 
time. It is also interesting to mention that these 3 rounds were undertaken under 3 
different governments as political power alternated between the 2 largest political 
parties over this period. Our choice of years therefore allows us to also account for 
the possibility that attitudes are affected by political biases. For the selected years, the 
final total cases achieved were 2,004 (1999), 1,197 (2005) and 2,400 (2012). To make 
a plausible assessment of the level of Social Capital present across Ghanaian society, 
we present descriptive diagrams based on respondents’ answers to questions that 
principally deal with Social Capital in the Afrobarometer survey. 
 
Like all surveys however, the Afrobarometer is not perfect. For our purposes, the first 
issue is that the questionnaire does not address all of the seven measures of Social 
Capital outlined by (Narayan and Cassidy 2001)’s typology. The second issue is that 
the survey does not address all measures, determinants and outcomes of Social 
Capital in all 3 years under study – some are captured for 2 out of the 3 selected 
years. Lastly, the phrasing of some questions and/or possible answers also varies 
between some rounds. The second and third issues are relatively unimportant for the 
following reasons: the most important Social Capital measures are unaffected; 2 years 
still allows a comparative analysis to be made; and we account for the differential 
wording in questions and/or answers in our presentation of results.  
The first problem is however more difficult to deal with and we have to (imperfectly) 
address this by relying on the 2003 Ghana Core Welfare Indicators Questionnaire 
(CWIQ) Survey of 2003 which captured measures of togetherness and neighbourhood 
connections. The CWIQ was a nationwide sample survey, designed to provide 
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indicators for monitoring poverty, vulnerability and living standards in the country, at 
national, regional and district levels. It was a district-based probability sample that 
covered a total of 49,003 households nationwide. The 2003 CWIQ Survey was based 
on a two stage national sample of households. At the first stage a sample of 
enumeration areas (EAs) was drawn from an updated national sampling frame 
derived from the 2000 Population and Housing Census. For the first stage selection, 
the frame was stratified within the 10 administrative regions into local government 
district domains comprising the 110 administrative districts, the sub-metropolitan 
areas of Accra, Kumasi and Shama-Ahanta East and Tema Municipal Area that was 
split into two zones. These divisions were accorded " Statistical district" status for the 
purpose of the CWIQ Survey, thus yielding a total of 121 district domains 
nationwide. At the first stage of sampling, a random systematic sample of 27 
enumeration areas (EAs) was drawn from each district stratum/domain, 
independently, with probability proportional to size of the EA (i.e. the number of 
households in the EA as obtained from the 2000 Population and Housing Census). At 
the second stage, households within each EA were listed and households were 
selected systematically from each to yield 49,005 household. The survey was 
designed to yield a total sample of 49,003 households nationwide but a total of 
43,880 households were successfully interviewed indicating a response rate of 88.5 
percent (GSS 2003). Based on our extensive research, this survey is the only other 
existing public survey in Ghana that explicitly satisfied our requirement of a (limited) 
component targeted at measuring subjective attitudes and perceptions.  Two Social 
Capital sub-measures (everyday sociability and volunteerism) are however not 
captured in any of the Afrobarometer rounds or in the CWIQ and we have no choice 
but to leave them out. We have no such problems for the Determinant and Outcome 
measures which are adequately captured by the Afrobarometer surveys.  
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3.3  Measurement of Social Capital  
 
While (Mladovsky and Mossialos 2008) provide the conceptual framework for the 
application of Social Capital to analysis of CBHI, the measurement of the concept, 
like any other in social science, is tricky.  “Theories such as Social Capital comprise 
constructs that are inherently abstract and require subjective interpretation in their 
translation into operational measures” (Narayan and Cassidy 2001). The earliest work 
to assess Social Capital on a cross-country basis is Ronald Inglehart’s World Values 
Surveys between 1981 and 1997 (Inglehart 1997). Its most well known aspects are 
the variables that deal with trust and group membership, those most intrinsically 
associated with Social Capital. Other country-based studies that have constructed and 
applied generic measures of Social Capital are (Onyx and Bullen 2000) (New South 
Wales), (Sudarsky 1999) (Barometer of Social Capital), (National Commission on 
Civic Renewal 1996) (Index of Civic Health, USA) and (Narayan and Cassidy 2001) 
(Global Social Capital Survey (GSCS)). Culled from (Narayan and Cassidy 2001), 
Figure 3 presents a summary of the variables investigated in the studies and is 
remarkable in the level of consistency across studies in the key dimensions 
highlighted as Social Capital measures. (Narayan and Cassidy 2001)’s construct 
represents the most comprehensive of the above studies in the dimensions and 
measures it employs and we therefore adopt their measurement framework, the 
parameters of which have already been mentioned under Research Design.  Their 
work draws extensively on prior research and consolidates the most standard 
approximations of Social Capital into a measurement framework; further validation is 
provided by the fact that the sets of Social Capital questions that encapsulate their 
measurement framework is consistent to a very large degree with the questions asked 
in the Afrobarometer series, our main data source. Their study is also of special 
application to this dissertation because the dimensions they include in their 
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framework were validated upon research application in Ghana and Uganda. 
 
Figure 3: Comparison of Social Capital Dimensions across studies (a tick 
indicates inclusion of that dimension in the particular measurement framework) 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 Current Sociology Vol. 49 N o. 2
Table 1 Comparison of Social Capital Dimensions Across Studies
Studies
————————————————————————————————
Underlying World New Barometer Index of Present 
Dimensions of Values South Social of National Study 
Social Capital Wales Capital Civic Health (GSCS)
Trust ✓ ✓ Institutional ✓ ✓
Includes Trust, including
institutional institutional trust
(government)
trust
Memberships in ✓ ✓ Horizontal ✓ ✓
associations/ relationships Included in the
participation in dimension ‘group 
local community characteristics’
Proactivity in ✓ Social control Empowerment
social context
Crime and safety ✓ ✓ (Outcome)
Neighborhood ✓ Horizontal Asking for help
connections relationships ✓
Family and friend ✓ Horizontal ✓ Everyday
connections relationships Divorce/ sociability
non-marital ✓
birth rates
Tolerance of ✓ (Outcome)
diversity
Reciprocity ✓ ✓ Included in the
dimension
‘generalized norms’
Political ✓ ✓ (Outcome)
engagement
Subjective ✓
well-being Variables related to
trustworthiness of
people; how well
people get along, etc.
are subsumed under
the social capital
dimensions
‘generalized norms’
and ‘togetherness’.
Variables specifically
related to self-
reported happiness,
satisfaction with life,
etc. are defined here
as outcome variables
07 Narayan (to/d/k)  30/7/01  3:21 pm  Page 64
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4. Assessing Social Capital in Ghanaian Society  
 
The literature reviewed above hypothesizes that Social Capital effectively underlies 
the ability of a social health insurance scheme to succeed in a voluntary setting.  Our 
interest in this study lies in the Social Capital that primarily determines the 
willingness to pay (enrol). If trust, togetherness and solidarity within and across 
heterogeneous groups in the society are crucial in gauging the potential for voluntary 
NHIS enrolment, what are their manifest levels in Ghanaian society?  
 
In this section, we assess the strength of Social Capital both within and across 
heterogeneous groups in Ghanaian society as revealed in the social norms, values and 
patterns of association (research question 1). We analyse the responses to questions in 
the Afrobarometer series, conducting the investigation with reference to the three 
broad categories of Social Capital measures, Determinant measures and Outcome 
measures (and their sub-categories) in (Narayan and Cassidy 2001)’s Social Capital 
Assessment Framework.  
 
4.1  Social Capital Measures  
 
4.1.1 Group Characteristics 
 
The level of memberships in informal groups, associations and networks with 
particular characteristics is a primary measure of Social Capital in a society. Since 
these groups are voluntary by nature, they represent social connectedness with 
reference groups. They are also a primary means of expressing solidarity – they are 
particularly important in lower/middle income countries, substituting for formal 
insurance in many cases (Sorensen 2000). The Afrobarometer surveys for 2005 and 
2012 reveal a consistent trend in the pattern of voluntary association membership in 
Ghana. In both years, an average of 70% of respondents affirmed non-membership of 
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trade unions/farmer associations, community development associations, 
professional/business associations and other voluntary groups (Fig 4). Religious 
group membership stands out as an important outlier – in 2005 70% of respondents 
affirmed active group membership. Although the results for 2012 appear to be 
confounded by the wording of the question (religious group that meets outside 
regular worship hours), slightly more than half of all respondents affirmed 
membership of a religious group. To further emphasize the importance of religious 
group membership, Figs. 5 and 6 report frequency of attendance of group meetings 
for (1999 and 2005 questions) and the importance attached by the respondent to 
religious activities (2012 questions). For 1999 and 2005, more than 70% of survey 
respondents attended religious services on a frequencies of either once a week or 
more than once a week, while 88% of 2012 respondents rated religion as very 
important in their life. 
 
 
Figure 4: Self-reported group membership levels (source: Afrobarometer) 
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Figure 5: Frequency of attendance of religious services (source: Afrobarometer) 
 
 
Figure 6: Importance of religion (source: Afrobarometer) 
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To summarize therefore, the survey reveals low levels of voluntary association 
membership in Ghanaian society, with the important exception of religious groups. 
Against this background therefore, the current low enrolment into the NHIS is not 
surprising – it is consistent with the revealed associational preferences exhibited for 
voluntary group membership across other groupings in the society. 
 
4.1.2 Generalised norms 
 
This Social Capital measure deals with generalized norms of reciprocity and 
exchange that determine the unit of trust and solidarity in society. These norms serve 
as positive or negative reinforcements of expected social behaviour – positive in 
returning benefits or favours, and negative in returning unfavourable treatment. 
Generalised norms are therefore a powerful Social Capital measure, reflecting the 
society’s ‘culture of relating to one another’.  
 
The results of the Afrobarometer for the years 2005 and 2012 are striking in this 
respect (Fig.  7). Upwards of 83% of the respondents in both years felt that one must 
be very careful when dealing with most people. The Core Welfare Indicators surveys 
had 46% of respondents saying that most people looked out only for their own 
interest and 20% saying that one could not say for a certainty what people’s 
behaviour would be in a given society (Fig. 8). Only 33% thought that most people 
try to be helpful. According to these results therefore, the norms of reciprocity in 
Ghanaian society reinforces negative behaviour – unfavourable treatment is expected 
from most people, and this has negative implications for solidarity, a key expression 
of Social Capital. 
 
 
	  	   42	  
 
Figure 7: Attitude for dealing with people (source: Afrobarometer) 
 
 
 
Figure 8: Perceptions of others helpfulness (source: Core Welfare Indicators 
survey, 2003) 
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4.1.3 Togetherness 
 
The Togetherness measure may be construed as an assessment of the extent of 
‘community’ in the society. It is a measure of whether and how members of the 
society get along. To a lesser extent, it is also a gauge of the feeling of belonging in 
the society. The Core Welfare Indicators survey indicates very little 
tension/disagreement or communal violence in Ghanaian society (Figs. 9 and 10). 
This is consistent with Ghana’s historic tradition of peaceful co-existence among 
diverse groups and is a positive indicator of Social Capital.  
 
Figure 9: Incidence of community tension (source: Core Welfare Indicators 
Survey, 2003) 
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Figure 10: Prevalence of community violence (source: Core Welfare Indicators 
Survey, 2003) 	  
4.1.3 Neighbourhood Connections 
 
 
Figure 11: Emergency support network (source: Core Welfare Indicators 
Survey, 2003) 
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Neighbourhood connections measures the extent to which people can fall on their 
neighbours temporarily in times of need. It is a measure of the extent of solidarity 
within the immediate neighbourhood, rather than just a measure of the frequency of 
association with those closest to you. The Core Welfare Indictors indirectly captures 
the extent of connections with neighbours through a question on the main source of 
support in times of need (Fig. 11). About half of respondents will rely on close 
family, while about a quarter report no one to rely on. Strikingly, only 7% of 
respondents consider their neighbours a source of help in times of need. Outside the 
family unit therefore, the perception of solidarity is quite weak according to the 
survey results.  
 
4.1.4 Trust 
 
Trust is the quintessential indicator that comes to mind when mention is made of 
Social Capital. If people find solidarity only in the family, (what (Banﬁeld 1958)) 
calls amoral familism), then horizontal relationships, which are a major source of 
Social Capital is lacking. Fig. 12 reveals that across all the 3 selected years of 
Afrobarometer surveys, trust was highest among relatives – 64%, 49% and 52% of 
respondents trusted their relatives ‘a lot’ in 1999, 2005 and 2012 respectively. The 
corresponding figures for neighbours were 39%, 28% and 22%, reflecting a 
substantial decline over the period. Also interesting is that fact that more people trust 
people from their own ethnic group ‘a lot’ (35% and 25% in 1999 and 2005 
respectively) than trust people from other ethnic groups (18% and 16%). When we 
look at the same indicator from the other side, 11%, 23% and 26% of respondents did 
not trust their relatives at all or trusted them only a little in 1999, 2005 and 2012 
respectively. For neighbours however, the corresponding figures were 21%, 40% and 
48%. A similar comparison can be made for own ethnic group versus other ethnic 
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group trust levels, where the respective 1999 and 2005 figures were 23% and 43% for 
own group, versus 39% and 55% for other group. In 2012, only 13% of respondents 
trusted other people they know ‘a lot’ (outside family and neighbours) while a 
combined 60% did not trust them at all or trusted them just a little. Apart from the 
striking differences in levels of trust for people of different relational proximities, 
there also appears to be a general trend of decline in inter-personal trust levels over 
the years across all the categories of relationships studied. 
 
Another measure of horizontal relationships is the trust levels in politicians, local 
government and the police/judges/courts. This is particularly important for institution 
building, and a critical determinant of successful society-wide collaboration. The 
results are not clear-cut when it comes to trust in police, judges and local government 
(Fig. 13). A quarter to a third of respondents in the 3 years report that they trust the 
authorities ‘somewhat’ – perhaps a reflection of politeness in response. However, 
50%, 32% and 57% of respondents report ‘not trusting the police at all’ or ‘trusting 
them just a little’ in 1999, 2005 and 2012 respectively; the corresponding figures for 
judges are 39%, 30% and 41%; and for local government 38%, 41% and 55%. These 
are worrying levels of mistrust for any society. Conversely, 18%, 38% and 18% of 
respondents trusted the police ‘a lot’ in 1999, 2005 and 2012; 24%, 35% and 25% did 
same for judges; and 21%, 33% and 15% reported same for local government 
authorities. Again, there’s a stagnant or declining trend in the trust levels for these 
authorities. 
 
Trust in politicians also presents a plausible measure of the extent to which vertical 
bridging linkages exist between the society and state actors. This has a huge impact 
on perceptions of accountability and on ordinary people’s willingness to participate in 
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state initiatives, as these are the people who exert control over the state. The 
importance of the measures should not be exaggerated too much though as politicians 
are generally suffer from low levels of public trust worldwide. Nevertheless, 
Ghanaian politicians appear to enjoy respectable levels of public trust as seen in Fig. 
14. 70%, 68% and 49% of respondents trusted parliamentarians ‘somewhat’ or ‘a lot’ 
in 1999, 2005 and 2012; while 75% and 56% reported same for the president in 2005 
and 2012. The ruling party was trusted ‘somewhat’ or a lot by 67% and 47% of 
respondents in 2005 and 2012, compared to 51% and 54% for the opposition. In 
1999, 61.4% of respondents trusted all political parties ‘somewhat’ or ‘a lot’. These 
figures are impressive given the generally low levels of public trust in politicians that 
are recorded in surveys across different countries in the world. There is no immediate 
a priori reason why this should be so, but it is plausible to say that it is an anomaly 
given the low levels of interaction with elected representatives, the low levels of 
perceived ability to influence representatives and the perceptions of corruption among 
public officials as reported under 4.3. 
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Figure 12: Intra-community trust (source: Afrobarometer) 
 
 
 
Figure 13: Trustworthiness public institutions (source: Afrobarometer) 
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Figure 14: Trustworthiness - Politicians (source: Afrobarometer) 	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‘nationhood’ because a priori, it would be unrealistic to expect very weak ethnic 
group identities within the Ghanaian context. That the majority of persons proudly 
perceive themselves either solely as Ghanaians or as Ghanaians in equal proportion to 
their tribal affiliations is a definite indicator of positive Social Capital. 
 
 
Figure 15: Identity (source: Afrobarometer) 
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everyday (Fig 16). Television has also become relatively important in recent times 
reflecting increased TV ownership across the population since the turn of the 
millennium; the proportion of respondents listening to the TV news everyday 
increased from 29% in 2005 to 40% in 2012. The proportion that report never 
listening to the news on radio has fallen from 19.6% in 1999 to only 8% in 2012 
while the corresponding proportion for TV has declined from 35% to 24% between 
2005 and 2012. Newspaper readership however has declined over the years – Only 
5% of respondents read a newspaper daily in 2012, compared to 13% in 1999, while 
those who never read newspapers have increased from 57% of respondents to 72%. 
To the extent that radio and television mediums broadcast relevant information 
therefore, the Afrobarometer results imply that there is an appreciable level of 
communication in Ghanaian society. 
 
 
Figure 16: Keeping Informed (source: Afrobarometer) 
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4.3  Outcome Measures 
 
4.3.1 Quality of Government 
 
Quality of government as an outcome measure of Social Capital considers the ease 
with which households obtain government services in everyday transactions. It is a 
reflection of the level of Social Capital inherent in the society. From (Fig. 17) below, 
it is evident that many respondents experience difficulties in obtaining government 
services, with the exception of medical treatment at public hospitals, which is 
somewhat easier to obtain. A combined 74% and 77% of respondents never try to 
obtain ‘household services’ or thought it was (very) difficult to obtain them in 2005 
and 2012 respectively; for obtaining ‘help from the police’, the corresponding figures 
were 70% and 67%; while the proportion which responded similarly for ‘obtaining 
identity documents’ were 49% and 60% in 2005 and 2012 respectively. Receiving 
medical treatment on the other hand is relatively straightforward with 60% of 
respondents finding it easy or very easy to obtain services. This outcome measure of 
Social Capital reveals difficulties.  
 
A further indication of the quality of government is the extent to which respondents 
perceived that they could influence their representatives in making changes in rules, 
policies and laws that affect their lives – whether their concerns are taken into 
account (Fig 18). In 2012, 63% of respondents felt that their MPs never listened to 
them, as against 32% in 2005; the corresponding figures for local government 
councillors were 53% and 28.2% respectively. The proportion of respondents who 
felt that their representatives listened to them sometimes or often was 46% and 30% 
for MPs and 47% and 37% for local government councillors respectively for 2005 
and 2012. These figures suggest that communication channels between the people 
and their elected representatives are far from satisfactory. 
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Figure 17: Obtaining Government services (source: Afrobarometer) 
 
 
 
Figure 18: Influencing Representatives (source: Afrobarometer) 
0.0%	  5.0%	  10.0%	  
15.0%	  20.0%	  25.0%	  
30.0%	  35.0%	  40.0%	  
45.0%	  
2005	   2012	   2005	   2012	   2005	   2012	   2005	   2012	  Household	  services	   Identity	  document	   Help	  from	  police	   Medical	  treatment	  Very	  dif@icult	   24.9%	   24.0%	   15.0%	   19.0%	   17.2%	   16.0%	   10.5%	   8.0%	  Dif@icult	   27.5%	   34.0%	   22.7%	   30.0%	   23.3%	   30.0%	   30.1%	   24.0%	  Easy	   17.2%	   17.0%	   33.7%	   25.0%	   20.2%	   22.0%	   36.0%	   41.0%	  Very	  easy	   4.1%	   5.0%	   9.3%	   13.0%	   3.0%	   9.0%	   10.3%	   20.0%	  Never	  try	   22.6%	   19.0%	   16.5%	   11.0%	   29.7%	   21.0%	   11.2%	   7.0%	  Don’t	  know	   3.7%	   2.0%	   2.8%	   2.0%	   4.8%	   2.0%	   1.8%	   1.0%	  
DifTiculty	  to	  obtain	  government	  services	  
Very	  dif@icult	  Dif@icult	  Easy	  Very	  easy	  Never	  try	  Don’t	  know	  
0.0%	  10.0%	  
20.0%	  30.0%	  
40.0%	  50.0%	  
60.0%	  70.0%	  
2005	   2012	   2005	   2012	  Members	  of	  parliament	   Local	  government	  councillors	  Never	   32.2%	   63.0%	   28.2%	   53.0%	  Only	  sometimes	   29.4%	   22.0%	   26.4%	   24.0%	  Often	   16.1%	   8.0%	   20.7%	   13.0%	  Always	   9.9%	   2.0%	   15.5%	   7.0%	  Don’t	  know	   12.4%	   4.0%	   9.1%	   3.0%	  
Representatives	  listen	  
Never	  Only	  sometimes	  Often	  Always	  Don’t	  know	  
	  	   54	  
4.3.2 Honesty and Corruption 
 
This quintessential manifestation of the level of Social Capital in a society is on par 
with trust in reflecting the extent of reciprocity and solidarity between societal actors 
with varying levels of power. Having to pay additional money to government 
agencies in order to get things done is a reflection of poor Social Capital. Perceptions 
of corruption are therefore a powerful indicator of the richness of a society’s Social 
Capital, and the level of institutional policing (transaction costs) that is required to 
ensure the success of collective endeavours.  
 
 
Figure 19: Corruption (source: Afrobarometer) 
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67% and 66% respectively). The astonishing levels of perceived dishonesty is a huge 
constraint for effective Social Capital building in Ghana. 
 
4.3.3 Peace, Crime and Safety 
 
This outcome measure, to an extent, reflects social cohesion, an important form of 
Social Capital. A low-crime society may reflect embedded feelings of belonging, 
association, reciprocity and solidarity. This effect may however be confounded by 
other important factors such as the level of policing or a general aversion to crime in 
the society. To the extent that these factors are can be controlled for, a low-crime 
society can reflect strong Social Capital.  
 
Figure 20: Crime and Safety (source: Afrobarometer) 
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never feared crime/violence at home, had their house broken into or been physically 
attacked in all the 3 years. The proportion reporting never being victims to crime also 
increased over the period. This is consistent with the earlier Social Capital measure of 
togetherness, which revealed a consistent trend of peaceful co-existence among 
different groups in the society.  
4.3.4 Political Engagement 
 
This final outcome measure of Social Capital reflects the degree of civic involvement 
by members of the public, and is intrinsically linked to individual perceptions of 
ability to influence social outcomes through participation. Political engagement also 
gives a hint of the potential for the state to engage the citizenry’s interest in state 
initiated programs. 
 
 
Figure 21: Citizen engagement (source: Afrobarometer) 
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There is a mix of signals when it comes to political engagement among the survey 
respondents. While the overwhelming majority of respondents voted in the previous 
election (Fig 22), the overwhelming majority in all years had also never contacted a 
local government councillor, an MP, an official of a government agency or a political 
party official over any issue (Fig 23). Again, majority of respondents responded that 
they had never attended a community meeting or joined others to raise an issue, or 
that they had not but would if they had the chance (Fig. 21). Indirectly therefore, the 
extent of political engagement appears to be effectively constrained by individual 
perceptions of very limited ability to influence decisions beyond casting the vote for a 
particular political party (which may actually be more influenced by considerations 
such as tribal affiliations).  
 
 
 
Figure 22: Participation in Elections (source: Afrobarometer) 
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Figure 23: Contact with representatives (source: Afrobarometer)  
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5. Analyzing Ghana’s NHIS through the lens of a 
Social Capital Framework 
 
The data presented above allows us to incorporate considerations of Social Capital 
into the discussions about Ghana’s NHIS. As noted under section 1.1.3, contributions 
from the informal sector currently make up a very small percentage of the Scheme’s 
overall revenues. With the Scheme tottering on the verge of bankruptcy, it has been 
suggested that increasing participation among this majority section of the Ghanaian 
workforce is a feasible way to improve the solvency of the NHIS.  
 
 
5.1  Theory meets the evidence 
 
Following from the discussion of the evaluative framework presented under section 
2.3, we analyse the potential for increasing voluntary informal sector participation in 
the NHIS in the light of the evidence on Social Capital presented in the previous 
section. Specifically, with reference to research question 2, this section summarizes 
the evidence on the social norms, values and patterns of association that are apparent 
from the data analysis and draws their implications for voluntary informal 
participation in the NHIS employing the four categories in our theoretical framework.  
 
5.1.1 Micro-level bonding Social Capital within communities 
 
For Ghana’s voluntary NHIS, the framework postulates that the major determinant of 
willingness to enrol/pay is bonding Social Capital inhering within communities. 
Trust, solidarity and norms of reciprocity within and across heterogeneous groups in 
society are the crucial social determinants here, and their existence to different 
extents and at different social levels may either provide positive Social Capital to 
drive voluntary enrolment or present effective social arguments to discourage it. 
Figure 12 implies that inter-personal trust in Ghanaian society is substantially present 
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only in familial relationships – individuals mainly trust their relatives and to a lesser 
extent, members of their own ethnic group. They exhibit substantially lower trust 
levels for other groups such as neighbours, members of other tribes and other people 
they know – in fact, perhaps it is more accurate to state that they do not trust these 
groups. Unsurprisingly therefore, Fig. 11 reinforces the familial relationship as the 
overwhelming Social Capital bond in the society by revealing that over half of 
respondents have their relatives as the main source of support in times of need. 
Contrastingly, only 7% of people perceive their neighbours as reliable sources of help 
in times of need while as much as a quarter had no one to fall on in a temporary 
crisis. In consonance with (Mladovsky and Mossialos 2008)’s argument that strong 
intra-group (family/tribe) ties must be complemented by positive bonds across groups 
in order to generate positive Social Capital, Figs. 7 and 8 reveal a marked dearth of 
solidarity in Ghanaian society as perceived by respondents. Only a third of the people 
surveyed thought that others tried to be helpful to them, with the overwhelming 
majority responding that people only looked out for their own interests or that their 
behaviour could not be predicted a priori. In response to the question of the attitude to 
adopt when dealing with people on a day to day basis, an even bigger majority (over 
80%) of respondents replied that one had to be ‘very careful’ when dealing with 
people in the ordinary business of life. The levels of self-reported voluntary group 
membership may therefore be interpreted as manifestations of this culture of a lack of 
trust and solidarity. With the important exception of religious groups, participation in 
social groups such as trade unions, farmer organisations, professional/business 
organisations and other voluntary associations is very low. When individuals do not 
trust each other in ordinary activities of life, selfish self-interest (or the perceptions of 
it) makes it very difficult for them to join together with others to advance common 
sublunary interests.  
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In summary, while familial relationships are perceived as a reliable bastion of help in 
emergencies, there is a palpable lack of solidarity outside this group and 
manifestations of weak Social Capital across heterogeneous groups in Ghanaian 
society. (Perceptions of) selfish self-interest also poses effective constraints to 
collective ambition as manifested in the low levels of voluntary group membership.  
If vested interest organisations such as trade unions, farmer organisations and 
business associations that can advance member interests with a high degree of 
certainty suffer low membership, then perhaps it is unsurprising that voluntary 
enrolment for the NHIS is low given that benefits may not accrue at all, as in the 
absence of illness. Similarly, if people see the family unit as the only trustworthy 
social relationship, it is plausible to infer that they are only willing to contribute 
towards the welfare of their immediate relatives and not towards a larger social pool 
with implicit cross-subsidisation. Individuals who expect their families to bail them 
out in times of health emergencies therefore have a reduced incentive to contribute to 
a social health insurance scheme with less than certain expected benefit occurrence. 
In the absence of a formal commitment mechanism therefore, this absence of 
solidarity is a critical missing factor in encouraging enrolment. 
 
Interestingly, when one considers ‘togetherness’ as measured by tension, 
disagreement or violence in the community, the responses imply a feeling of 
community, hypothesizing the existence of some positive Social Capital. The 
measures considered above however make it explicit that the apparent sense of 
‘togetherness’ belies the fact that social connections are weak across heterogeneous 
groups, and that the lack of violence, tension and disagreement may reflect factors 
other than the existence of positive Social Capital linkages. While we refuse to 
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speculate on what such factors may be, it is obvious that when the whole spectrum of 
measures are considered, the balance of the evidence indicates that the most vaunted 
forms of Social Capital (trust, solidarity and positive reciprocity) are lacking in 
Ghanaian society; and this is consistent with the low levels of voluntary enrolment 
into the NHIS. 
5.1.2  Micro-level bridging Social Capital  
 
The Social Capital measures mentioned above are somewhat difficult to explain in 
terms of the determinant measures experienced in the Ghanaian case (Figs. 15 and 
16), which would predict positive Social Capital in Ghanaian society. It inures to the 
benefit of Ghanaian society that the majority of people identify themselves with the 
nation as such feelings can spur productive effort for the common good. An informed 
citizenry is also more likely to be active participants of civic initiatives than an 
uninformed one. However, just as the Social Capital measures considered above 
imply, it is apparent that an appreciable sense of nationhood and the proliferation of 
radio and TV mediums of communication are not sufficient to guarantee the existence 
of useful social relationships. In fact as mentioned by (Mladovsky and Mossialos 
2008), it is doubtful whether policy can, or indeed should attempt to, construct 
affective and emotional relationships. Therefore, while good undertakings in their 
own right, the promotion of a free press or a campaign for increased identification 
with the Ghanaian nation will not of themselves birth communal norms of trust, 
solidarity and positive reciprocity. The low rates of civic participation, whether it is 
joining others to raise issues or attending community development meetings reflect 
this dearth in collective action potential 
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5.1.3 Bridging Social Capital at the macro-level 
The Social Capital context that affects the potential for voluntary enrolment into the 
NHIS is also reflected in the outcome measures to which we now turn our attention. 
In their framework, (Mladovsky and Mossialos 2008) conceive that engagement by 
state officials (local and central) in promoting and sustaining citizen involvement 
generates positive Social Capital that vastly improves the potential for successful 
implementation of social policies.  
Embeddedness, which constructs Social Capital through continuous informal 
interactions between public actors and their communities, suffers a dearth in the 
Ghanaian context according to the data presented above. That the overwhelming 
majority of respondents to the surveys had never contacted a government official 
(local or central) or other representative is symptomatic of a lack of a culture of 
interaction between state actors and members of the society. Given that the NHIS is 
implemented by a public agency, this is an indication that there are problems with 
creating embeddedness or what is more commonly referred to as ‘fostering 
ownership’ for social policies in Ghana. Perhaps this lack of interaction is explained 
by the fact that majority of respondents in both years surveyed for attitudes of 
representatives felt that representatives were barely interested in listening to their 
concerns when making decisions that affect their lives (Fig. 18). This general ethos 
indicates a lack of effective communication channels through which society members 
may interact with their representatives. If people feel that they cannot influence even 
the leaders who depend on their votes to secure office, then it follows that they may 
perceive that they lack a means of influencing unelected public servants (NHIA 
officials). Such a perceived lack of community influence presents a negative marker 
for the pursuit of embeddedness in social policy and possibly serves as a disincentive 
to voluntary enrolment in the NHIS.  The reasons adduced for the revision of the 
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NHIA law to, among other things, abolish the District Mutual Health Insurance 
Scheme (DMHIS) as the basic unit of the NHIS (Government of Ghana 2012) also 
provide further evidence of problems posed by a weak institutional environment 
when seeking embeddedness in social policy. The major reason cited by the NHIA 
was a lack of accountability by the DMHISs. It remains to be seen how responsive 
the new structure will be to subscribers, but the experience so far indicates that the 
NHIS has not as yet been adequately ‘embedded’. 
Another area in which bridging Social Capital at the macro-level is important for the 
successful implementation of a CBHI is complementarity. This involves the 
“provision of public goods and an enabling rule of law, while private institutions 
produce goods and services” (Mladovsky and Mossialos 2008 pp. 599). At least on 
the surface, Ghana’s NHIS appears to have ‘complementarity’ inherent in its design 
because the law mandates the NHIA to accredit providers (after quality assessment) 
before they can provide services under the scheme, and to continuously monitor 
providers to guarantee the quality of healthcare services. Good quality of care has a 
positive effect on (continued) willingness to enrol (Dong, De Allegri et al. 2009, 
Polonsky, Balabanova et al. 2009). The surveys we employ are lacking in direct 
information on perceptions of the competence, effectiveness or quality of the NHIA, 
but there is some indirect evidence on the Ghana Health Service (GHS). Obtaining 
hospital services is relatively easy when compared to accessing household services, 
identity documents or help from the police. It must be noted however that a majority 
of Ghanaians pay out-of-pocket for medical services as the NHIS currently covers 
only 36% of the population (National Development Planning Commission 2013). To 
the extent that receiving medical services is dependent on making payments, the 
positive ratings medical services enjoys may not be necessarily a result of effective 
monitoring and regulation by the NHIA. With specific regards to receiving services 
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under the NHIS, other studies have revealed poor (perceived) quality of care (SEND-
Ghana 2010), (Alfers 2009). This, together with the difficulties reported in accessing 
other ‘public goods’, shapes negative perceptions about an effective government 
complementarity role. Social Capital theory postulates that this will hinder voluntary 
enrolment.  
5.1.4 Bonding Social Capital at the macro level 
 
Organisational integrity among the institutions that transcend the public-private 
divide is an expression of macro Social Capital that has a positive influence on social 
policy. If the social relations among the bureaucracy foster the positive norm of 
pursuing collective goals coherently and competently, there will be a positive effect 
on professionalism and capacity building that will inexorably lead to improved 
outcomes in social policy. In the absence of a strong Weberian bureaucracy however, 
(Evans 1996) argues that state-society synergy will not be a good force and will foster 
corruption instead. The balance of the evidence in Ghana forcefully supports this 
latter view. Reflecting the dearth in positive reciprocity at the micro-level, corruption 
at the macro level is a major problem in the country (Fig 19). It seems implausible to 
assume that these perceptions of corruption will have no bearing on the decision to 
voluntarily contribute money towards a social pool over which the individual has 
very little control. There is a deficiency in bonding Social Capital at the macro level, 
and this reinforces the incentives to stay away from a voluntary SHI.  
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5.2 Social Determinants of Informal sector participation in Ghana’s NHIS 
 
The analysis indicates that the low level of participation in the NHIS by Ghana’s 
large informal sector is inadequately explained in the health insurance discourse 
grounded in economic and health systems frameworks. The commonly held view that 
premiums are preventing the “majority poor” from enrolling can only be partially 
true. Ghana is touted to have reduced poverty rates from 52% in 1992 to 28.5% in 
2006 at the measurement of $1.25 per day (PPP) (World Bank 2014)). Annual 
premiums charged for NHIS membership range from Gh¢ 7.2 to Gh¢ 48 ($4.8 to $32 
in 2011) based on ability to pay, but in practice the absence of accurate data on 
incomes means that the typical DMHIS applies a flat rate to subscribers in its 
catchment area. This was estimated at a national average of Gh¢ 8-10 ($5.3 – 6.7) by 
(Blanchet, Fink et al. 2012), with urban Accra having a significantly higher average 
of Gh¢ 21 ($14). (Amporfu 2013) also reports Gh¢ 21 as the average premium 
charged by DMHISs in Accra and Kumasi. A person living in Accra on just $1.25 
would therefore be able to pay his premium in 12 days if he (unrealistically) forewent 
all other expenditure. Assuming that he instead saved $0.05 a day, he would be able 
to pay his annual premium in 280 days. These extreme calculations using the highest 
cost areas for health insurance premiums are just to make the point that the 71.5% of 
Ghanaians who live above the poverty line could afford to pay the NHIS premiums if 
they so wished. This implies that current 35.5% NHIS participation rate of the 
informal sector (National Development Planning Commission 2013) is more than just 
a question of affordability. Discussions concerning subscriber enrolment into the 
NHIS that are founded in the economic and health system frameworks therefore fail 
to totally explain the mechanisms at work here. The status quo is even more baffling 
given the documented catastrophic nature of out-of-pocket healthcare spending in 
Ghana (Lewis 2007, Osei-Akoto and Adamba 2010, Novignon, Nonvignon et al. 
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2012). These show that the pursuit of increased informal sector membership is 
unlikely to be a viable policy option to improve the NHIS’ financial sustainability 
prospects.  
 
It is apparent then that income and economic theory based frameworks are 
insufficient to capture the complex array of factors at play in Social Health Insurance 
initiatives that are founded in voluntary Community-Based Health Insurance 
Schemes. Such concern has led the search for new evaluative and explanatory 
frameworks that can systematically incorporate the critical social context into the 
discussion. (Mladovsky and Mossialos 2008) present the most comprehensive 
adaptation of a Social Capital framework for the conceptual analysis of CBHI. In 
particular, they were interested in explaining why most CBHIs “do not appear to be 
on course to follow the 19th century precedent, achieving significant levels of 
population coverage in a sustainable way”. The analysis presented above on Ghana’s 
NHIS lends support to their assertion. Regarding the four types of Social Capital 
presented in the framework, (Woolcock 1998 p. 186) argues that “all four dimensions 
must be present for optimal developmental outcomes. This successful interaction 
within and between bottom-up and top-down initiatives is the cumulative product of 
an on-going process that entails ‘getting the social relations right’.” We have 
therefore examined Ghana’s NHIS under this lens in order to see the direction in 
which the decision to voluntarily enrol is influenced by the existing social context.  
 
The analysis implies that voluntary enrolment into the NHIS may be negatively 
affected by a poor level of bonding Social Capital as reflected by paucity of trust and 
positive reciprocity in Ghanaian society. Beyond the familial unit, there is not much 
in terms of solidarity, a key catalyst for any social health insurance scheme, which 
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assumes an even higher level of importance in the absence of a formal compulsion 
mechanism. The perception that only familial bonds are reliable (and therefore 
valuable) appears to have crowded out voluntary enrolment in the NHIS – beyond the 
familial, most people are not interested in cross-subsidizing healthcare for others. 
Measures of group membership and civic participation also reveal poor levels of 
micro-level bridging Social Capital, with the important exception of religion. The 
important social role that religious organisations play in Ghanaian society has been 
well documented (Addai, Opoku-Agyeman et al. 2013). If the NHIA would more 
formally incorporate them into its enrolment drive, their Social Capital could lead to 
increased (and sustained) voluntary enrolment, through playing possible roles in 
serving as a commitment mechanism (sustained social pressure on congregants) and 
premium collectors (weekly instalments that may be easier for members to pay). 
Currently however, the lack of micro-level bridging Social Capital in other societal 
arrangements negatively affects voluntary enrolment into the NHIS. 
 
The NHIS is also challenged with regards to embeddedness and complementarity, 
two critical roles played by bonding Social Capital at the macro-level. There is 
insufficient interaction between state actors and society members and this makes it 
difficult to foster ownership of the NHIS. The feeling among individuals that they 
have little influence on public officials is a disincentive to participation in a collective 
endeavour for which payment is required. In the case of untoward outcomes, how 
will their complaints be addressed? Who will they even complain to? If even they are 
not voiced out, subconsciously, these social considerations will affect the decision to 
voluntarily pay for social health insurance. These negative perceptions are further 
reinforced by a weak complementary role by the public authorities, both actual and 
perceived. The disenrollment of many hitherto NHIS subscribers has been explained 
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in many circles by the poor quality of service received, a perfectly understandable 
reaction. Institutional weaknesses complete the abysmal picture of Social Capital in 
Ghanaian society as reflected in weak state-society synergy. The high levels of 
corruption in Ghanaian society epitomises weak bonding Social Capital at the macro-
level, serving as another potent disincentive to voluntary enrolment in a social health 
insurance scheme. 
 
When all four types of Social Capital are considered therefore, the analysis finds that 
the low levels of voluntary enrolment into Ghana’s NHIS are totally consistent with 
the implications of Social Capital framework.   
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6. Conclusion 
 
The study was set out to investigate the potential for universal informal sector 
participation in a Social Health Insurance Scheme with foundations in Community-
Based Health Insurance Schemes, using Ghana’s National Health Insurance Scheme 
as a case study, and has identified Social Determinants that affect the decision to 
voluntarily enrol. The study has also sought to know whether the oft-prescribed 
policy intervention of seeking improved informal sector membership is a viable 
endeavour in the noble quest for Universal Health Coverage and what its feasibility 
or otherwise means for financial sustainability efforts. 
 
The general theoretical literature on this subject and specifically in the context of low 
income countries with large informal sectors is steeped in economic and health 
system perspectives and is inconclusive on several vital questions on the frequently 
poor performance of CBHIs with respect to informal sector membership and 
therefore as a means of achieving UHC. Using an alternative of a Social Capital 
theory-based framework, the study has sought an explicit consideration of Social 
Factors that should be incorporated in the conceptualisation, design and 
implementation of CBHI-founded SHI schemes in low-income, informal-sector 
dominated countries by seeking answers to the following questions: 
 
(1) What do the revealed social norms, values and patterns of association indicate 
with regards to the strength or otherwise of Social Capital in Ghana? 
(2) What are the implications for voluntary informal sector participation in 
Ghana’s NHIS? What do they mean for the Scheme’s design with regards to 
financial sustainability?  
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The main empirical findings are chapter specific and were summarized within the 
respective empirical chapters: Assessing Social Capital in Ghanaian Society and 
Analyzing Ghana’s NHIS through the lens of a Social Capital Framework. 
 
a. Evidence on social determinants of voluntary SHI enrolment and willingness to 
pay: Overall, the Social Capital that inheres within and across various social 
groupings in Ghana is weak. With the exception of familial and religious groupings, 
there is not much intra and extra-community trust, solidarity and positive reciprocity. 
The revealed social norms, values and patterns of association show that there is weak 
Social Capital in Ghanaian society.  
 
b. Implications for informal sector membership: ‘Amoral familism’ appears to have 
crowded out voluntary NHIS enrolment – the combination of poor levels of trust, 
solidarity and positive reciprocity of social norms and values give a poor outlook in 
terms of the potential to significantly improve the current poor level of informal 
sector membership in Ghana’s NHIS.  
c. Financial sustainability efforts: In its current contraption, the NHIS is unlikely to 
be able to significantly increase informal sector membership on its own in the quest 
to improve its solvency.  
The theoretical cases for voluntary CBHI membership therefore need to be 
augmented with consideration of social determinants in order to achieve a more 
complete understanding of the dynamics of the decision-making among informal 
sector workers and how this knowledge can be incorporated into the design and 
implementation of CBHI-founded Schemes in low-income countries. The economic 
systems frameworks frequently couch willingness-to-pay (and therefore enrol) in 
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terms of rational individual utility-maximization considerations. Dissemination of 
market information about price, quality and benefits are therefore frequently 
prescribed in order to drive membership (Dror 2001, Pauly 2007).  It is however 
noted from this study that ingrained resistance to collective effort may thwart the 
obvious risk-minimization benefits of insuring against high out-of-pocket health 
expenditures. Trust, solidarity and mutual concern for others beyond the familial unit 
affects people’s willingness to pay – invariably, Social Capital is vital for the 
effective functioning and sustainability of CBHI.  This pattern is consistent with that 
presented by (Atim 1999, Hsiao 2001, Jowett 2003, Zhang, Wang et al. 2006). Social 
factors also directly influence the perceptions of the health system in the general 
context of institutional functioning (Bennett 2004, Bennett, Kelley et al. 2004, Criel, 
Atim et al. 2004), and the low trust levels invariably affect the perceptions of 
pervasive institutional decay, with negative consequences for voluntary CBHI-
membership. 
Ghana’s NHIS is one particular health financing intervention with extended economic 
and health system theoretical underpinnings which has been hailed as an icon of 
success by varied actors, including the World Health Organization (Durairaj, 
D’Almeida et al. 2010). However, evidence from several studies, including from the 
World Bank, reveal that the Scheme is seriously challenged on many fronts including 
the informal sector membership and financial sustainability that are the focus of this 
study (Apoya and Marriott 2011, Schieber, Cashin et al. 2012). This study has used 
empirical analyses to show that the current design of the NHIS ignores important 
social considerations that are critical to the Scheme’s success. The theoretical 
arguments for this justification suggest the need for a review of the current 
implementation model to incorporate a social commitment mechanism to effectively 
drive and maintain membership (Mladovsky and Mossialos 2008) – in Ghana’s 
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specific case, the formal involvement of religious groups may have a tremendous 
positive effect. Alternatively, while formalization of the economy represents the ideal 
that Ghana must aspire towards (De Soto 2003), innovative tax financing that 
leverages current formal-informal sector linkages to progressively raise revenues for 
the NHIS can significantly improve the Scheme’s financial sustainability prospects in 
the short to medium term. As summarized succinctly by (Wagstaff 2010 pp. 510)  
“covering the poor by paying their contribution through general revenues has proved 
easier than persuading the informal sector to enroll.” 
The scale of the SHI debate across developing countries is therefore extensive and 
multifaceted. To generate sustainable policy interventions, there is the need for more 
case studies at the country level that allow further assessments of the Social Capital 
dimensions of the subject. This study, which has offered an evaluative perspective on 
an important national social welfare program utilizing data collected for a different 
purpose, is a humble attempt in that direction. The limitations of the methodology 
employed notwithstanding, the important role of Social Capital for the success of 
CBHI-based Social Health Insurance Schemes in today’s developing world has been 
conclusively demonstrated. In spite of the economic and health system frameworks’ 
emphasis on individual utility-maximization and the quality of care obtained under 
insurance as the main areas of focus for Ghana’s NHIS, the Scheme’s success has 
been thwarted by the lack of consideration for Social Determinants in its design and 
implementation. Within the context of a low-income and informal-sector dominated 
economy, these Social Determinants have been shown to be vital for SHI viability 
and sustainability.
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